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ABSTRACT: A philosophical debate between particle physicists and solid state physicists roiled 
as these sub-disciplines competed for financial support, social approbation, and intellectual 
prestige through the second half of the twentieth century. Their disagreement hinged on the 
nature of fundamental research. The particle physics community adopted a reductionist 
approach, arguing that the fundamental physical laws were those governing the smallest 
constituents of matter and energy. In part in response to this position, solid state physicists 
developed a range of more permissive perspectives on what type of physics could be 
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fundamental, all of which stressed the importance of higher-level characteristics, maintaining 
that investigations at many levels of complexity might yield fundamental insight. This paper 
traces the dispute over fundamentality, which grew both from the specific problems physicists 
encountered while building their professional infrastructure, and from the demands of funding 
their research in Cold War America. Through an exploration of how physicists developed 
philosophical positions within institutional contexts and deployed those positions in their 
rhetoric, I argue first that professional pressures both motivated and exerted influence over the 
construction of such views, second that philosophical views had a reciprocal guiding effect on 
the institutional and professional development of Cold War physics, and third that these views 
were further bent, blunted, and reshaped when deployed in high-stakes rhetorical discourse. The 
case studies through which this story unfolds indicate that further attention to such philosophical 
commitments is warranted when examining the historical development of scientific institutions, 
communities, and hierarchies. 
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[FIRST LEVEL HEADING] INTRODUCTION 
What does it mean for physics to be fundamental? That question pervaded physicists’ 
efforts to organize their rapidly expanding discipline through the second half of the twentieth 
century. Solid state physics and particle physics, respectively the most populous and most 
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prestigious branches of Cold War American physics, negotiated their relationship through an 
intricate and delicate dance as they grew into distinct sub-disciplines. They often found 
themselves competing for funding, institutional resources, personnel, and public approbation. At 
other times, they allied to advocate for the importance of physics as a whole to American society. 
Within these negotiations, which ranged from cautious diplomacy to blood sport, the authority to 
define the term “fundamental” as applied to physics was hotly contested turf. This paper traces a 
protracted philosophical debate over the nature of fundamentality. It demonstrates how 
physicists’ philosophical attitudes towards fundamentality, themselves motivated and defined by 
professional and institutional challenges at several scales, in turn guided subsequent institutional 
and professional developments in American physics.1 
Any discussion of fundamentality naturally suggests questions of reduction and 
emergence, which have garnered considerable attention from both historians and philosophers.2 It 
was a critical element of fundamentality debates, but also at issue were questions about how 
close of a relationship physics should maintain with applications, how physics should connect 
                                                
1 These debates did not neatly group solid state physicists on one side and particle physicists on 
the other; however, these categories do describe the core interlocutors. The relevance of many of 
the stances described here to the institutional and professional goals of each sub-disciplinary 
group makes the otherwise overly broad dichotomy an instructive one.  
2 See, for example: Helge Kragh, Higher Speculations: Grand Theories and Failed Revolutions 
in Physics and Cosmology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Mark A. Bedau and Paul 
Humphries, eds., Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2008); Robert W. Batterman, The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in 
Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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with other scientific disciplines, and how it should be internally ordered. Although the reduction-
emergence dichotomy is one way in which the debate broke down, appreciating the range of 
influence fundamentality debates had on American physics will require considering these other 
factors alongside it. 
With that in mind, I propose understanding physicists’ views on fundamentality on two 
axes: first according to whether they are restrictive or permissive, and second according to 
whether they define fundamentality as a relational or as an innate property of scientific 
knowledge. Restrictive positions propose that fundamental insight occurs only at one scale, 
whereas permissive positions maintain that such insight can be had at many different scales. 
Relational fundamentality proposes that scientific knowledge becomes fundamental by virtue of 
how it connects with other knowledge, scientific or otherwise, whereas the innate view suggests 
that scientific knowledge is fundamental by virtue of the type of knowledge it is. 
Of the four possible combinations defined by these two axes, three were at play during 
the era under investigation. The restrictive/innate view took the form of a reductionist position 
articulated by particle physicists, who argued that fundamental knowledge was found exclusively 
among the smallest components of matter and energy.3 Solid state physicists and their allies 
explored both types of permissive views at various times. The first, the permissive/relational 
view, is defined by a quality I call fecundity. The degree to which physical knowledge found 
new and novel uses in other research areas was one common measure of how fundamental it is. 
                                                
3 Though this perspective jibes well with reductionism, it is not necessarily reductionist—a 
restrictive perspective might deny physical hierarchy entirely, for instance. See: Miriam Thalos, 
Without Hierarchy: The Scale Freedom of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013). 
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Within this category, individuals emphasized different types of cross-field relevance. For some, 
the discovery of general principles with a wide range of applicability was the relevant measure. 
Others looked to technological, economic, and social relevance in addition to scientific 
relevance. The permissive/innate view manifested as emergence: fundamentality defined by the 
independence of laws or concepts at multiple scales of complexity. These laws and concepts can 
be independent either in practice or in principle, and we can find examples of both arguments in 
the rhetoric of twentieth-century physics. 
The most relevant positions articulated by working physicists in mid-to-late twentieth 
century America were thus defined predominantly by reduction, fecundity, and emergence. 
These categories are not those of the actors, in part because the debate described here was a 
complex and messy one, in which interlocutors often talked past one another and neglected to 
define their terms to the level of precision that would satisfy a professional philosopher. I do not 
intend to reify this scheme, but to loosely categorize the confoundingly diverse array of positions 
physicist took on the fundamentality question over the half-century or so covered by the case 
studies in this paper. These examples describe how American physicists’ stances towards 
fundamentality evolved. Each case considers the distinctive characteristics the relevant views 
assumed in different contexts and at a different level of applicability. At each of these levels of 
scientific organization—individual research installations, prestige hierarchies within physics, and 
the national funding context—physicists’ convictions manifested themselves differently, and 
with different results.4 
                                                
4 John A. Schuster and Richard A. Yeo, “Introduction,” in The Politics and Rhetoric of Scientific 
Method, ed. John A. Schuster and Richard A. Yeo (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986), ix–xxxvii, esp. 
xi–xv, set out a similar hierarchy. They claim that the rhetoric of scientific method operates on 
  6 
I begin with the National Magnet Laboratory (NML) at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT). The NML began operations in the early 1960s, realizing goals its founder, 
Francis Bitter, had pursued since the late 1930s. Bitter viewed fecundity as the primary 
component of fundamentality and his convictions shaped the lab’s research objectives and 
pedagogical priorities.5 The NML’s autonomy to pursue its mission, however, was challenged by 
the funding cutbacks just a few years after it opened. As the only large national facility dedicated 
to high magnetic fields at the time, its direction became determined more by how it fit within a 
                                                                                                                                                       
three levels of discourse. First, in the laboratory, it provides a way to rationalize an often messy 
and non-linear process of knowledge production. Second, they identify the institutional 
organization of the sciences as the level on which scientists negotiate disciplinary politics. 
Finally, they discuss how those who articulate science in wider social and cultural contexts 
deploy the rhetoric of the scientific method. I identify similar hierarchical divisions, but contend 
that their boundaries are fuzzy and their interactions rich, and argue that the views developed and 
used within each level functioned as more than mere rhetorical strategies. 
5 The term “philosophical” is slippery in this context. Physicists are not professional 
philosophers and it would be a stretch to call the physicists’ convictions about best practices 
“philosophies.” Physicists did, however, articulate bona fide, self-consciously philosophical 
stances in response to changing contextual factors in the 1960s and 1970s. Because these views 
articulated foundational principles to guide physicists’ understanding of physical knowledge, and 
to place pre-existing beliefs about intellectual prestige, scientific merit, and rational resource 
allocation on a well-considered foundation, they are philosophical in a substantive sense. 
Understanding their precursors, whether or not they achieved the same degrees of rigor, is 
therefore essential to assess their historical importance. 
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nationwide ecology of large laboratories and how far it could bend to meet prevailing funding 
priorities. This case study demonstrates both the potential for views such as Bitter’s to shape 
individual labs, and their limitations in the face of large-scale national trends. 
The second case study interprets explicit expressions of philosophical positions by 
working physicists and shows how changes within the physics community during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s motivated physicists to develop and articulate otherwise tacit philosophical 
views. Anderson, in the famous 1972 article “More Is Different” was motivated to articulate a 
detailed defense of emergentism in part by the growth of reductionism in the particle physics 
community, and the consequences for the professional landscape of Cold War physics. The same 
funding pressures and disciplinary tensions that threatened the National Magnet Laboratory’s 
mission prompted Anderson and others to revisit the types of convictions that had grounded 
Bitter’s vision for his laboratory and to refine them into philosophical platforms that could 
underwrite claims for intellectual recognition, disciplinary authority, and federal funding. In this 
way, changes in the professional politics of physics motivated individuals to examine reinforce 
the philosophical foundations of their research. 
Finally, disagreements over the merits of the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s indicate how those views fed into debates about national science 
policy. Having developed strong philosophical justifications for their work through the preceding 
decades, solid state and particle physicists were prepared to press them into service both in 
Congress and in the court of public opinion. As they locked horns over the direction of science 
funding in the United States, their philosophical squabble became concrete, and so again their 
views adapted to meet the needs of the moment. Anderson, for instance, backed off the 
innateness of fundamentality and embraced relational arguments he had avoided in the 1970s. 
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Similarly, particle physicists, while still espousing reductionism, scrambled to show that their 
intellectual output had meaningful relationships both with technology and with other areas of 
science. The case of the SSC, like that of the NML, shows us both the potential and the 
limitations of scientists’ philosophical commitments. Those commitments provided a framework 
in which debates over institution building, prestige, and federal funding played out during the 
SSC controversy. But they also became blunted by use. Philosophical convictions, however 
devoutly held, proved little match for the existing expectations of federal funders. In becoming 
shibboleths for disciplinary communities, physicists’ philosophies intertwined with realities of 
practice and bent to meet the political exigencies of the moment. That physicists’ philosophical 
convictions proved malleable against the force of national funding priorities, however, does 
nothing to diminish the subtle but pervasive influence they exerted over the development of Cold 
War physics at several levels 
Elements of these case studies have been examined in the literature through the lens of 
unity.6 Jordi Cat, in his discussion of Anderson’s arguments for emergence, observes that solid 
state physicists “place[d] the burden of unity in methodology,” while their particle physicist 
counterparts advocated reductive unity.7 In a similar vein, Hallam Stevens describes how 
                                                
6 As in Peter Galison and David J. Stump, eds., The Disunity of Science: Boundaries, Contexts, 
and Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). 
7 Jordi Cat, “The Physicists’ Debates on Unification in Physics at the End of the 20th Century,” 
HSPS 28, no. 2 (1998): 253–299, on 254. The question of whether or not a piece of physics was 
fundamental is meaningfully different from the question of how physics is unified, especially 
when examining professional contexts. Unity was central when physicists reflected upon their 
field as a whole, particularly with respect to other sciences. When internecine tensions 
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reductionism grew within the particle physics community in part because the theoretical power 
of the symmetry concept underwrote particle physicists’ claims to ultimate knowledge, which in 
turn allowed them to distance themselves from military research when it became controversial in 
the mid-1960s.8 Cat, Stevens, and others have tended to consider conceptual factors when 
examining the relationship between philosophy and physics.9 Richard Staley has recently 
observed this trend and commented that “historians have done too little to illuminate the broader 
disciplinary context” philosophical debates between physicists reflect.10 Physicist Max Dresden, 
although he was not addressing historians, has also argued for the centrality of philosophical 
conviction to professional and institutional development. By way of attacking the absolutism 
associated with some brands of reductionism, Dresden insisted that “[j]ust what is surprising, 
unexpected, new, or important depends on the total intellectual, emotional status of the 
individual and his or her personal reactions to the philosophical, social, political environment, as 
                                                                                                                                                       
developed, however, physicists turned to fundamentality as a way to rank and privilege 
competing subfields. 
8 Hallam Stevens, “Fundamental Physics and its Justifications, 1945–1993,” HSPS 34, no. 1 
(2003): 151–197. 
9 The philosophical literature on effective field theories is another notable example. See: 
Jonathan Bain, “Effective Field Theories,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics, 
ed. Robert W. Batterman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 224–254 and Elena 
Castellani, “Reduction, Emergence, and Effective Field Theories,” Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Modern Physics 33, no. 2 (2002): 251–267. 
10 Richard Staley, “Trajectories in the History and Historiography of Physics in the Twentieth 
Century,” History of Science 51, no. 2 (2013): 151–177, on 164. 
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well as his or her equally personal reactions to scientific fashions and the general scientific 
ambience.”11 He continued by noting that philosophical and emotional stances towards the scale 
structure of the natural world directly inform the institutional structure of the sciences.  
This paper responds to the need Staley identifies by exploring the dynamics of the 
contexts Dresden describes. The episodes reconstructed below show how the same philosophical 
commitments that grew from and influenced conceptual developments also played a central role 
in shaping the disciplines and institutions of American physics in the second half of the twentieth 
century. On the basis of these case studies, this project echoes Staley’s call for historians to 
consider scientists’ philosophical commitments when examining institutions, disciplines, and 
other large-scale features of science’s historical development. 
 
[FIRST LEVEL HEADING] BACKGROUND: POST-WORLD WAR II GROWTH OF SOLID 
STATE AND PARTICLE PHYSICS 
Pre-World War II American physics lacked a robust sub-disciplinary infrastructure. 
Physicists identified as theorists or experimentalists and formed professional networks around 
common research interests, but these intellectual groupings had no institutional analogues. That 
began to change after World War II when nuclear physics, flush with the prestige of the 
Manhattan Project, attracted a growing proportion of young physicists and established a model 
                                                
11 Max Dresden, “The Klopsteg Memorial Lecture: Fundamentality and Numerical Scales—
Diversity and the Structure of Physics,” American Journal of Physics 66, no. 6 (1998): 468–482, 
on 471. 
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for sub-disciplinary cohesion.12 Groups with common interests, conscious that both government 
and industry were primed to make large material investments in science, sought dedicated 
institutional representation.13 
In 1943, as American physicists were planning their transition to peacetime, Harvard 
theorist John H. Van Vleck maligned the “balkanization” of American physics. He applied the 
term to Roman Smoluchowski’s suggestion that the American Physical Society (APS) establish a 
division of metals physics.14 Smoluchowski, son of the Polish physicist Marian Smoluchowski, 
was a research physicist at General Electric.15 Seeking to galvanize a community of physicists 
                                                
12 David Kaiser, “Cold War Requisitions, Scientific Manpower, and the Production of American 
Physicists after World War II,” HSPS 33 (2002): 131–159 and “The Postwar Suburbanization of 
American Physics,” American Quarterly 56 (2004): 851–888, has tied this shift in the 
organization of American physics to pedagogical realities created by the post-World War II 
influx of students into graduate programs. 
13 Spencer Weart, “The Solid Community,” in Out of the Crystal Maze: Chapters from the 
History of Solid State Physics, ed. Lillian Hoddeson, Ernst Braun, Jürgen Teichmann, and 
Spencer Weart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 617–669, and Joseph D. Martin, “Solid 
Foundations: Structuring American Solid State Physics, 1939–1993” (PhD dissertation, 
University of Minnesota, 2013) both describe the process by which a loosely affiliated group of 
physicists interested in the properties of solids organized efforts for representation within the 
American Physical Society. 
14 John Van Vleck to Saul Dushman, 29 Jan 1944, CRS, Box 1, Folder 1. 
15 The elder Smoluchowski worked predominantly in statistical physics, and today is 
remembered, among other accomplishments, for exorcizing Maxwell’s demon. John D. Norton, 
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who shared his interest in metals, he approached several colleagues to help draft a letter 
marshaling support for a metals division. Smoluchowski and his colleagues distributed the letter 
to 53 physicists nationwide.  
Van Vleck was one of them. Responding to the letter, he rejected the assumption that 
dedicated institutional representation would protect the interests of metals physicists. Van Vleck 
worried that APS-sanctioned partitions would inhibit free and open communication between 
physicists with divergent research interests and undermine the “Quaker spirit” of the APS 
meetings, where physicists of all stripes could converse freely on the lawn outside the Bureau of 
Standards in Washington, D.C. where the APS traditionally held its annual convocation.16 
Smoluchowski, who hoped strong institutional structures would facilitate communication, 
replied to Van Vleck expressing his desire to “stir up a movement to give younger physicists a 
chance to meet, through Symposia, other physicists interested in the same field and at the same 
time to give them more voice in the Society.”17 Their disagreement hinged on whether imposing 
organization upon the APS membership would serve their shared ideal of open scientific 
discourse. Smoluchowski viewed metals physicists, especially those working in industry, as 
marginalized. He emphasized the potential of institutional structures to give them influence 
within the APS. Van Vleck suspected that further institutional apparatus would break up a tight-
knit community, and thought that a new division would attract industry-based metallurgists, 
engineers, and physical chemists, whom he did not consider true physicists. Despite Van Vleck’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
“All Shook Up: Fluctuations, Maxwell’s Demon and the Thermodynamics of Computation,” 
Entropy 15, no. 10 (2013): 4432–4483. 
16 Van Vleck to Dushman (ref. 14). 
17 Roman Smoluchowski to John Van Vleck, 15 Mar 1945, CRS, Box 1, Folder 2. 
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and others’ concerns, the APS Division of Solid State Physics—having been broadened from the 
original proposal for a division of metals physics—was established in 1947. 
The nuclear and particle physics communities underwent similar processes around the 
same time. Nuclear physics took full advantage of the Atomic Energy Commission’s National 
Laboratories to build a network of reactor-based research sites, parlaying the success of the 
Manhattan Project into enthusiastic federal patronage.18 The infrastructure that resulted from the 
rapid growth of particle accelerators, especially stemming from Ernest Lawrence’s Berkeley 
laboratory, gave physicists who focused on elementary particles the means, method, and 
opportunity to branch off from nuclear physics.19 The scale of the machinery and consequent 
necessity of large, dedicated facilities to conduct the relevant experiments helped establish a 
disciplinary culture that allowed these subfields to achieve autonomy.20 By the end of the 1950s, 
solid state, nuclear, and particle physics were firmly established. 
                                                
18 Peter J. Westwick, The National Labs: Science in an American System, 1947–1994 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
19 John L. Heilbron and Robert W. Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory: A History of the 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 
20 See Laurie M. Brown, Max Dresden, and Lillian Hoddeson, “Pions to Quarks: Particle Physics 
in the 1950s,” in Pions to Quarks: Particle Physics in the 1950s, ed. Laurie Brown, Max 
Dresden, and Lillian Hoddeson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 3–39 and 
Peter Galison, Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997). The American Physical Society’s Divisions of Nuclear Physics and 
Particles and Fields were not established until 1967 and 1968, respectively. The groups were 
dominant enough within the American Physical Society in the years shortly after World War II 
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The growth of a sub-disciplinary menagerie encouraged direct competition for resources 
and prestige. For a time, government and military funds were sufficient to support most research 
groups and keep tensions low. The sudden leveling off of government funding in the mid-1960s, 
after the community had expanded so rapidly, constituted a Malthusian moment for American 
physics. Its new sub-disciplines, growing into adolescence, became embroiled in sibling rivalry. 
The following case studies indicate how those tensions interacted with the incompatible 
conceptions of fundamental research that matured within competing sub-disciplinary camps. 
 
[FIRST LEVEL HEADING] CASE STUDY 1: FRANCIS BITTER AND THE NATIONAL 
MAGNET LABORATORY 
In 1939, Francis Bitter articulated his vision for metallurgy in an unpublished document 
entitled “Abstract of the Present State and Possible Developments in Physical Metallurgy.” Bitter 
had earned his Ph.D. in physics from Columbia in 1928, but joined MIT in 1934 in the 
Department of Mining and Metallurgy, where he would remain until transferring to the 
Department of Physics in 1945. Between leaving Columbia and joining MIT, Bitter spent time at 
assorted and auspicious institutions. He conducted postdoctoral research with Robert Millikan at 
Caltech, worked as a research physicist for Westinghouse, and visited the Cavendish Laboratory 
on a Guggenheim Fellowship. During these appointments his interests evolved from his thesis 
                                                                                                                                                       
to make due without specialized divisional representation. I. I. Rabi even maintained that 
divisions were only necessary for “peripheral fields.” Council of the American Physical Society, 
Minutes of the Meeting Held at Chicago, 25 and 26 Nov 1949, American Physical Society 
meeting minutes and membership lists, 1902–2003, NBL. 
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work on the magnetic susceptibilities of gases to the nature of ferromagnetism.21 His outlook was 
also shaped by a pre-doctoral stint in Berlin in 1925–1926, during which he immersed himself in 
the unfolding quantum revolution.22 Arriving at MIT fresh off his Guggenheim, Bitter was 
enthusiastic, and his outlook on metallurgy optimistic. He imbued his hopes for the field with a 
physicist’s conception of fundamental progress, articulated in his “Abstract,” that shaped his 
subsequent efforts to craft the National Magnet Laboratory’s mission. 
Bitter described his strategy for molding metallurgy into fundamental science:  
During my brief association with the subject of metallurgy I have obtained the impression 
that in this field more than any I have come into contact with, there is now an opportunity 
for rapid and fundamental development through an application of the concepts and 
techniques of physics and chemistry. The achievement of such progress must come as a 
result of the cooperative effort of a group of men whose chief interest it is to discover and 
                                                
21 Ferromagnetism research in the 1930s was particularly lively, and pointed to questions of 
foundational importance for the subsequent development of solid state physics. See Stephen T. 
Keith and Pierre Quédec, “Magnetism and Magnetic Materials,” in Hoddeson, et al., Crystal 
Maze (ref. 13), 359–442. 
22 Francis Bitter, Magnets: The Education of a Physicist (New York: Doubleday & Company, 
Inc., 1959), 55. Bitter recalled that during his time in Berlin he heard Max Planck speak on 
thermodynamics, attended the colloquium at which Erwin Schrödinger introduced wave 
mechanics, and taught himself electricity and magnetism from Max Abraham’s textbook, The 
Classical Theory of Electricity and Magnetism. Since this text was not available in English 
translation at the time, Bitter most likely refers to the 1923 German edition: Max Abraham and 
August Föppl, Theorie der Elektrizität (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1923). 
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classify the properties of metals and alloys in all their generality with the aim of 
formulating physical laws, rather than to follow the behavior of certain special alloy 
systems in detail with the aim of developing and understanding commercial processes.23  
Bitter distinguished between the engineering and the scientific components of metallurgical 
research and found that through insufficient development of the latter, the former lacked “proper 
help and stimulation of a fundamental nature.”24 He described how metallurgy might position 
itself to make what he deemed fundamental contributions, which involved building a robust 
conceptual foundation rooted in physics and chemistry, plus a strategy for collaborating across 
disciplinary boundaries to borrow techniques and insights from fields with established 
fundamental research programs. This grand vision for metallurgy might just as well have been a 
roadmap for solid state physics. It called for understanding general features of metals through 
theoretical physics, a focus on mechanical properties, research on crystal structure, and increased 
understanding of phase transitions, all of which would fall under the auspices of solid state once 
the field cohered after World War II. 
Bitter’s understanding of fundamentality was permissive. Physics had it, chemistry had it, 
and metallurgy could attain it by adopting the nobler habits of these disciplines. Bitter’s 
optimism for the future of metallurgy required a two-stage process of fostering basic insights and 
then building a close relationship with practical applications, a relationship he believed drove 
scientific progress generally. “The physicist develops the fundamental laws which the engineer 
applies. In chemistry we have a similar situation,” he wrote, before presenting his rhetorical call 
                                                
23 Francis Bitter, “Abstract of the Present State and Possible Developments in Physical 
Metallurgy,” ca. 1939, FBP, Box 5, Folder MIT Magnet Lab. 
24 Ibid. 
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to arms, asking: “Who, in metallurgy, is doing a similar job?”25 Bitter emphasized that 
constructive dialogue between abstract science and its applications could generate advances in 
both, and that establishing regular discourse between the them was necessary to make the field of 
metallurgy a fundamental science. 
Two criteria for fundamentality can be distilled from Bitter’s disquisition on metallurgy. 
The first, a theoretical criterion, was the formulation of general principles; the second, a practical 
consideration, was usefulness in a wide variety of new research. The main flaw Bitter perceived 
in contemporary metallurgical work was lack of emphasis on codifying regularities in the 
behavior of metals. The field lacked the generalizing input of theory. The hallmarks of 
fundamental disciples, Bitter maintained, were theoretical principles that applied—and that 
actually were applied—beyond narrowly defined systems. A science concerned with the 
properties of metals and alloys, therefore, could become fundamental by crafting a theoretical 
scheme useful for describing the properties metals and alloys as a class of materials. 
Organizing existing knowledge into a generalized scheme, though, was not the ultimate 
goal of fundamental research; fundamental science also had to prove useful in areas where 
knowledge was less sure-footed. Bitter emphasized fecundity as a marker of fundamentality. 
This term implies the actuality, not just the potential, for generating intellectual progeny: the 
general principles that satisfy Bitter’s first criterion can be deemed fundamental once they prove 
their worth in a realm for which they were not specifically designed. Characterizing Bitter’s 
primary criterion in this way makes clear that fecundity-based fundamentality is only 
recognizable once the actual influence of a piece of research is known. From this perspective, 
achieving fundamentality demands more than modeling research on disciplines that already 
                                                
25 Bitter, “Physical Metallurgy” (ref. 23). 
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exhibit it; it requires building the personal and institutional relationships through which research 
efforts can exercise real influence. Science becomes fundamental, in the fecundity sense, when 
those relationships have born fruit by successfully provoking new research and serving as a 
foundation for new conclusions. 
Bitter perceived this quality in physics and chemistry. Both sciences aimed to formulate 
general principles, but more importantly, rich interactions between inquiry and applications 
drove progress in these sciences and made them broadly applicable to fields like metallurgy and 
engineering. For Bitter, the problem was not just that metallurgists wanted for a robust theory of 
metals; they were not even in dialogue with people who were working to develop one. In the 
absence of such an interaction, Bitter thought, metallurgy would be limited to cataloguing and 
quantifying the properties of a growing alloy zoo. This type of research, because it did not pursue 
general laws or ask novel questions, could never be fundamental. His remedy was to encourage 
metallurgists to overcome the insularity of their field and collaborate with physicists and 
chemists to build the bridges that would foster new thinking. Bitter’s recommendations called for 
MIT metallurgists to change the way they organized their department and fit within Institute 
infrastructure, suggesting, for example, that “one or two physicists in the metallurgy department 
… carry out their work in close contact with the rest of the staff,” and promoting “closer contact 
with [John C.] Slater’s work in Physics and with the work of [Charles W.] MacGregor in 
Mechanical Engineering.”26 
                                                
26 Ibid. The appellation “fundamental” was commonly employed permissively around this time. 
Bitter was in accordance with the accepted usage by suggesting that sciences other than physics 
could be fundamental. Frederick Seitz, writing just a few years later, identified “fundamental” 
with “pure” research, defining it as that “which has intrinsic value as a form of culture.” He 
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Generality, fecundity, and interdisciplinary collaboration—the pillars of Bitter’s view of 
fundamental knowledge—were pivotal to the founding and growth of the National Magnet 
Laboratory two decades later. Bitter coordinated planning for the NML, which opened in 1960 as 
a facility dedicated to high magnetic field research. Its early history reflects Francis Bitter’s 1939 
vision. The proposal that convinced the Air Force Office of Scientific Research to fund the lab 
framed its mission compatibly with Bitter’s notion of fundamentality, its goal being “to make 
continuous fields up to 250,000 gauss available for fundamental research in solid state and low 
temperature physics and related fields, and to serve as a center for advancing the art of field 
generation.”27 By 1960, Bitter’s had transferred to the physics department and he built the NML 
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27 “Proposal for a High Field Magnet Laboratory,” 8 Sep 1958, NMLR, Box 1, Folder 55. 
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with solid state physics, rather than metallurgy, in mind.28 The NML would support foundational 
research in order to enrich the field and make it more productive. A quote from Bitter’s 
laboratory dedication speech, composed long before budget concerns caused NML staff to 
emphasize its practical offshoots, indicates the place he saw it occupying within the scientific 
community: “The solid-state research program is being transferred from the M.I.T. magnet 
laboratory to the new facility [the NML]. The aim of this program is to increase knowledge of 
the basic electrical, magnetic, optical, acoustical, and thermal properties of solids. This 
fundamental information, pursued for its own sake, has and will continue to provide the basis for 
the continuing development of new and improved solid-state electronic devices.”29 Concern with 
establishing an environment in which fundamental research could flourish was at the forefront of 
Bitter’s thinking. With the NML, he institutionalized his convictions about fundamental research, 
hoping that its structure would encourage research that could serve as the basis for something 
more.30 
                                                
28 Bitter took a leave of absence from MIT to work on degaussing naval ships during World War 
II. During this time, his metallurgical magnetism laboratory was dismantled and its resources 
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29 Francis Bitter, “Dedication of the National Magnet Laboratory,” 30 Apr 1963, FBP, Box 5, 
Folder NML Dedication Notes. 
30 The extent to which it was possible in practice for an installation such as the NML to be truly 
devoted to basic research while operating on military funding is a matter of some debate. See: 
Paul Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as Basis for Physical Research in 
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[Fig. 1 about here] 
Administrative responsibility was shared among the departments that used the NML. 
Beyond offering a venue for research using high magnetic fields, the facility provided an 
interdepartmental forum for MIT scientists and engineers and attracted visiting researchers from 
other institutions, again in accordance with Bitter’s view that fundamental work should be 
outward looking. The NML was also an educational space. Bitter had admonished the 
metallurgical community in 1939 that fundamental advances required training students to ask 
fundamental questions. In the early 1960s, the NML promoted itself as just such an opportunity 
for MIT graduate students. A 1963 brochure emphasized this aspect of the lab’s mission, touting 
the “opportunity to pursue extremely fundamental speculations” graduate students enjoyed, 
citing work on magnetic field dependence of the velocity of ultrasonic waves in metals one 
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doctoral student was pursuing.31 By 1965, the lab’s second full year of operation, its 13 academic 
staff supported 24 students, who worked alongside 9 researchers from Lincoln Laboratory—
which MIT administered—and 56 visiting scientists.32 
The NML provided the space, resources, community, and pedagogical opportunities 
necessary for a solid state research facility embodying Bitter’s vision. Bitter, who was nearing 
the end of his career, did not take an active role in the lab’s administration. Benjamin Lax 
became its first director. Lax was Hungarian-born, but had immigrated to the United States in his 
youth and earned his bachelor’s degree at Cooper Union in 1941. He was drafted while pursuing 
doctoral work at Brown and arrived at MIT in 1944 as a Radiation Laboratory researcher. He 
stayed on after the war, completed his Ph.D. in 1949, and joined the Lincoln Laboratory shortly 
thereafter, rising to head of the Solid State Division in 1958. 
The selection of Lax as NML director represented the desire to coordinate solid state 
research across departments. John Slater, who wielded significant influence as an Institute 
Professor and head of the physics department’s solid state and molecular theory group, wrote to 
MIT President Julius Stratton as plans for the NML were brewing: “I feel that if we seized the 
opportunity presented by the Magnet Laboratory, if it goes through, and correlated it with […] 
work on solids in the departments of Physics, Chemistry, Electrical Engineering, and some of 
that in Metallurgy, we should have the possibility of building up a solid-state laboratory of great 
value not only to M.I.T. and the educational program, but to the services and the country as a 
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whole.”33 Slater advocated grouping representatives from these departments “together with Lax 
and as much of the Lincoln solid-state group as could possibly be included, in a great 
cooperative organization, if possible housed together on or close to the campus, and including 
both students, professors, and research scientists of the Lincoln type.”34 Support from figures of 
Slater’s prominence ensured that the new lab, beyond absorbing the existing magnet program 
Bitter had established, would seek greater integration of solid state work across MIT’s campus. 
With institutional support for interdepartmental collaboration secured, Lax carried 
Bitter’s ethos forward. “I believe it is important for us to provide in the field of basic solid state 
and applied physics, centers of excellence that will contribute to education and to science in a 
most effective way,” he wrote to Roman Smoluchowski in 1965.35 The NML was productive. By 
December 1965, its thirty-eight staff members had published sixty-one papers that calendar year, 
with twenty-nine more in press, accepted, or submitted, and had collectively delivered seventy-
nine meeting or colloquium talks. These numbers more than doubled 1963 totals, far outstripping 
the 18.75 percent staff increase in the same interval.36 Of the 61 articles, book chapters, and 
monographs published in 1965, more than half, thirty-seven, were published in American 
Institute of Physics journals. Of these, nineteen appeared in the Physical Review or Physical 
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34 Ibid. 
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Review Letters, the flagship publications dedicated to basic physical research.37 These articles 
contributed to major contemporary solid state research trajectories, for instance by examining the 
band structure of solids and properties of superconductors. Although crude, these data indicate 
that a large proportion of the lab’s output was dedicated to the type of foundational work Bitter 
championed. 
The facility was a strong draw for young talent within the solid state community. Lab 
director Benjamin Lax found himself with an embarrassment of riches in the mid-1960s and 
complained to the National Research Council’s Solid State Sciences Panel that despite having 
“interviewed a greater fraction of first-rate young scientists than we have throughout my entire 
career … with very few exceptions, we reluctantly turned these away.”38 Lax himself won the 
Oliver E. Buckley Prize in 1960, which, although less than a decade old at that point, was among 
the most prestigious accolades a solid state physicist could garner. He would be elected to the 
National Academy of Sciences in 1969. It was not for want of results that the Air Force’s 
enthusiasm for the facility began to wane in the mid-1960s. 
In 1965 the NML administration asked the National Science Foundation (NSF) to take 
over financial responsibility for visiting scientist support and a share of both magnet 
maintenance and research costs from the Air Force. Funding for the laboratory had stalled after 
                                                
37 The remainder were spread over the Journal of Applied Physics (8), Review of Scientific 
Instruments (4), Applied Physics Letters (2), and one each in the Journal of Chemical Physics, 
Journal of Mathematical Physics, Physics of Fluids, and Physics Today. 
38 Benjamin Lax to Roman Smoluchowski, 10 Mar 1965, John C. Slater Papers, American 
Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, PA, Folder National Academy of Science-National Research 
Council, Solid State Sciences Panel. 
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its initial ramp-up. Widespread national shortages in basic science funding, coinciding with the 
escalation of the Vietnam War, became a prod with which to nudge the lab towards a more 
explicitly applied stance. Lax noted with some alarm the Air Force’s increased interest in the 
applicable fruits of magnet research in 1967: “This is a complete change from the past when 
NML was discouraged from including in its charter an applied program.”39 Lloyd A. Wood, 
director of the physical sciences division within the Air Force’s Office of Scientific Research, 
substantiated this observation, writing to Lax a month later: “It is as you know becoming more 
and more an issue in Washington to ‘couple’ federally supported basic research to ‘practical’ 
enterprises, and a large project such as the Magnet Laboratory has a great opportunity for doing 
this.”40 
An eye towards applied benefits was not incompatible with the NML’s stated mission, 
which had, since Bitter’s early vision, emphasized the importance of basic insight for 
technological advance. “Coupling” of basic research funding with explicitly practical 
considerations, however, challenged Lax’s vision for the lab and he resisted any reorientation of 
the NML’s core mission. He was happy to accommodate an overtly applied program so long as 
the Air Force was willing to supply the requisite funding, but maintained: “Financially we are in 
no position to begin such work on our own.”41 Lax also pushed to keep applied projects and their 
funding isolated from the operations and basic research budgets. He testified before Congress on 
the transition from Air Force to NSF funding, for instance, that the NML “has always coupled its 
basic research results with the mission-oriented agencies having the greatest interest in a 
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particular line of development and will continue to do so,” while qualifying that commitment by 
saying, “[w]hen there is a development of special interest to an agency we will solicit support 
and participation by that agency, whether it be the Air Force or other DOD department, NASA, 
NIH, or the environmental agencies.”42 Explicitly applied projects were fine, in Lax’s eyes, so 
long as they did not divert attention or funding from the fundamental work he considered the 
lab’s raison d’être. 
As negotiations with the NSF continued through the mid-1960s, the laboratory faced tight 
budgets and an uncertain future. The NML advisory committee was initially agitated. In 
February 1966, the committee struck a defiant tone in the face of restrictive budgets, maintaining 
“the strong opinion that a moderate and orderly expansion of funding is desirable,” and further 
noting: “It is discouraging and unhealthy for a Laboratory, after a vigorous initial period of 
building up from zero to a viable state, to be abruptly leveled off by budgetary constraints, when 
large areas of interesting and appropriate research remain.”43 Just over a year later, the committee 
was more resigned to the difficult environment. An April 1967 report offered less resistance to 
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budgetary stasis, and resignedly noted: “similar budget freezes affect all solid state physics 
research, if not most scientific research activities in this country at the present time.”44 
Lax was not so content to accept the lab’s struggles just because they were symptomatic 
of larger trends. He vented his frustration in a letter to a fellow solid state physicist, Harvard’s 
Nicolaas Bloembergen: “It is true that there is a budget squeeze all throughout the country, 
particularly on solid state. However, as it turns out, funds have been found for other areas of 
physics which are already better funded overall nationally than the solid state activities at the 
universities. This, in spite of the fact that solid state constitutes by far the largest segment of the 
physical society.”45 Lax was similarly candid in a letter to National Science Foundation director 
Leland Haworth, calling it “preposterous … that the country’s only national facility for high 
magnetic field research is hamstrung while millions are being spent on redundant facilities in 
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other scientific disciplines.”46 By “redundant facilities,” Lax almost certainly had in mind the 
National Accelerator Laboratory (NAL)—better known as Fermilab—plans for which the 
Atomic Energy Commission had approved just months earlier. Lax, the director of a large, one-
of-a-kind solid state research facility was irked that accelerator laboratories were proliferating 
while his own was being forced to curtail its programs. 
In what Lax considered a serious concession, the NML’s work did shift in a more applied 
direction towards the end of the 1960s. In 1968, the number of publications by NML staff in the 
Journal of Applied Physics (18) equaled the combined total of those published in Physical 
Review and Physical Review Letters.47 An April 1969 Advisory Committee report noted the 
addition of a program designed to explore medical applications of magnetic fields.48 In the early 
1970s, the lab initiated more aspirational applied projects, such as the magneplane, which 
endeavored to translate the NML’s knowhow into magnet-powered railroad system. The 
magneplane was a particularly sore point for Lax, who felt it epitomized the concessions the 
NML had made to Vietnam-era demands for applied payouts from solid state facilities pursuing 
basic research. On more than one occasion, NML research scientist Henry Kolm, who headed the 
project, clashed with Lax’s over the lab’s mission. 
In a memo to Lax entitled “Magnetism Applications Projects,” Kolm described himself 
as “the only strong-minded SOB who has survived in your entourage,” and voiced his frustration 
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with Lax’s disapproval of Kolm’s applied interests: “Our magnetism applications programs are 
not a concession to expediency, an act of prostitution in the bleak years of 69 to 71. They are a 
long-neglected obligation of the scientific community. They are giving new relevance to our 
graduate education, revitalizing our professional stature, and improving the survival chances of 
the laboratory, of MIT, and of the entire scientific establishment.”49 Kolm objected to Lax’s 
contention that the raft of applied projects the lab had acquired syphoned funds from its mission-
critical research. In a stark indication of the depth of their disagreement of the NML’s mission 
and direction, Kolm suggested: “if you find it impossible to integrate a significant applications 
program into the ‘core’ work of the laboratory in such a way that you and others do not resent its 
existence, then serious consideration should be give [sic] to severing it administratively […] by 
creating a new laboratory.”50 
No such schism was forthcoming, but the tensions between Lax and Kolm reveal the 
extent to which changes in federal science policy challenged the NML’s mission. Lax, who 
administered in accordance with Bitter’s vision of fundamental research, was shaken by the need 
to take on applied projects for their own sake. Kolm, representing a younger generation, was less 
ideologically opposed to adding applied objectives to the laboratory’s mission. 
By 1971 the NML—renamed the Francis Bitter National Magnet Laboratory in 
November 1967, following Bitter’s death—had found more stable, if not more generous, 
financial support from the NSF. Its struggles through the late 1960s and early 1970s are telling: 
Francis Bitter’s view of fundamentality, although realizable in a major research laboratory, did 
not fare as well in the larger funding environment. The Air Force, its enthusiasm for facilities 
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devoted to non-applied work dwindling, began transferring responsibility to a civilian agency, 
limiting the lab’s expansion, well before the 1973 Mansfield Amendment compelled such a 
transfer on a larger scale.51 
As the NML struggled, particle accelerators thrived. Unlike solid state physicists, who 
could not justify a large facility without invoking potential practical outcomes, particle physicists 
reaped large-scale expenditures based on the promise of fundamental knowledge, as future NAL 
director Robert R. Wilson famously did in 1969 when he told Congress that the proposed 
accelerator “has nothing to do directly with defending our country except to make it worth 
defending,” and insisted that the search for fundamental physical knowledge provided the same 
culturally ennobling qualities as art and literature.52 
Particle physicists, ambivalent over military and economic justifications for their research 
in the face of 1960s protest movements, widely embraced the high-minded rhetoric of 
fundamentality that Wilson’s congressional testimony epitomized.53 They were successful in 
casting particle physics as “a grand cultural enterprise, elegant and profound, that deserved the 
support of society.”54 That avenue to funding, especially large-scale government funding, was 
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not available to solid state physicists, who by the 1960s were already too closely associated with 
technology in the imaginations of federal funders. The permissive view of fundamentality around 
which Bitter had build the NML failed to fill the lab’s coffers. Five-year plans and annual reports 
to the Air Force stressing the NML’s fundamental contributions could not replicate the rhetorical 
success of Wilson’s eloquent testimony on behalf of the NAL. Faced with this failure, the 
NML’s solid state physicists felt slighted by the comparatively more severe funding shortfalls 
they suffered and resented the emerging perception in the particle physics community that 
fundamental knowledge could only be derived from the ultimate constituents of matter and 
energy. These frustrations extended beyond the walls of the NML. At the dawn of the 1970s, 
solid state physics was a mature discipline, confident in its ability to generate fundamental 
scientific knowledge, but it was in the midst of an identity crisis exacerbated by unfavorable 
comparisons to its more lauded siblings. 
 
 
[FIRST LEVEL HEADING] CASE STUDY 2: “MORE IS DIFFERENT” 
Philip W. Anderson, a Bell Laboratories solid state theorist, was also perturbed by the 
financial difficulties basic solid state research faced. Anderson had completed his Ph.D. with 
John Van Vleck in 1949. He immediately joined the solid state group at Bell where he imbibed 
the spirit of the Bell system, in which, after winning the favor of his supervisor, William 
Shockley, he could pursue his interests almost unencumbered.55 Bell was still buzzing from the 
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invention of the transistor two years earlier, which promised to revolutionize the 
telecommunications industry. This and other high-profile successes attracted a slew of talented 
young physicists and Anderson found himself among a uniquely large and accomplished 
assemblage of solid state theorists and experimentalists. Stefan Machlup, a postdoc who 
overlapped with Anderson, wrote to Shockley to recount his impressions and recalled, “I think 
everybody on my hall was doing exactly what he wanted to do,” and expressed awe at the 
concentration of expertise, observing that although “it’s not as ‘gemütlich’ [cozy] as a college 
campus … [i]f you’ve got an obscure technical problem, chances are that somewhere in the two-
mile network of corridors sits the expert on this particular specialty.”56 Through the 1950s and 
1960s, benefiting from Bell’s vibrant intellectual climate, Anderson conducted the research that 
would earn him the Nobel Prize he shared with the University of Bristol’s Neville Mott and his 
advisor, John Van Vleck, in 1977, “for their fundamental theoretical investigations of the 
electronic structure of magnetic and disordered systems.”57 
[Fig. 2 about here] 
By the late 1960s, however, even denizens of the Bell oasis could detect twinges of the 
concern abroad in the solid state community. In the spring of 1967 Anderson delivered a lecture 
at the University of California, San Diego that formed the seed of his 1972 Science article, 
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“More Is Different.” The talk grew, as Anderson later recalled, from the simmering discontent he 
perceived within the solid state community.58 In Anderson’s view, nuclear and particle physicists 
monopolized influential government advisory roles, many prominent universities hired solid 
state faculty only as an afterthought, and solid state physicists had trouble breaking into 
prestigious institutions such as the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). The NAS member 
rolls validate Anderson’s concern. Between Charles Kittel in 1957 and both Anderson and 
Charles Slichter in 1967, the Academy admitted six solid state physicists compared with twenty-
seven nuclear and particle physicists.59 
Anderson was also responding to the particle physics community’s reductionist view of 
fundamentality, in particular to Victor Weisskopf’s distinction between intensive and extensive 
research (Fig. 3).60 Weisskopf, who had served on Anderson’s doctoral examining committee, 
identified two camps in the physics community in a 1967 Physics Today article; “intensivists,” 
he claimed, sought first principles above all else, while “extensivists” ferreted out useful 
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applications of those principles, either to technology or to other scientific fields.61 The intensivist 
position, as Weisskopf described it, aptly characterized the view of fundamentality particle 
physicists adopted in the 1960s.62 Similarly, his description of extensive research captured one 
aspect of the type of fundamentality Bitter championed, with the caveat that Weisskopf would 
not have called that type of research fundamental.  
[Fig. 3 about here] 
Weisskopf cited Alvin Weinberg—not to be confused with particle theorist Steven 
Weinberg—as a paradigm extensivist. Alvin Weinberg, a nuclear physicist by training, wrote a 
Physics Today article in 1964 warning of tough choices ahead as funding for scientific research 
plateaued. As the director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, he would be charged with deciding 
which projects to pursue and which to sideline when funding tightened. Anticipating this 
challenge, Weinberg proposed criteria for determining which research could claim priority in 
funding battles. He echoed Bitter’s view of fundamental research as work that provides a 
foundation for further developments, articulating what would become known as the Weinberg 
                                                
61 Viktor Weisskopf, “Nuclear Structure and Modern Research,” PT 20, no. 5 (1967): 23–26, on 
24. 
62 The assumption that general principles are worked out in one realm before being applied in 
another is also prominent within the history of physics. It has contributed to the impression that 
solid state physics was a field devoted to mere applications of more fundamental work. Jeremiah 
James and Christian Joas challenge this assumption in “Subsequent and Subsidiary? Rethinking 
the Role of Applications in Establishing Quantum Mechanics,” Historical Studies in the Natural 
Sciences (this issue). They argue that so-called applications of early quantum mechanics made 
many essential contributions to the foundations of the theory. 
  35 
Criterion: “The word ‘fundamental’ in basic science, which is often used as a synonym for 
‘important,’ can be partly paraphrased into ‘relevance to neighboring areas of science.’ I would 
therefore sharpen the criterion of scientific merit by proposing that, other things being equal, that 
field has the most scientific merit which contributes most heavily to and illuminates most brightly 
its neighboring scientific disciplines.”63 Conceptual fecundity was only one element of 
Weinberg’s fundamentality calculus. His view included not only conceptual content, but also 
technological fruitfulness and social relevance as components of fundamentality. Tested against 
these criteria, Weinberg rated particle physics as poor, writing, “I know of few discoveries in 
ultra-high-energy physics which bear strongly on the rest of science.”64 
Weinberg pushed this agenda vigorously at the 1964 meeting of the APS in Washington, 
arguing: “Science which commands great public support must be justified on grounds that 
originate outside the particular branch of science demanding the support; it must rate high in 
social, technological, or scientific merit, preferably in all three,” and challenging particle 
physicists “to state their case clearly, to say exactly why it is that elementary-particle physics is 
as important as all our elementary-particle physicists believe it is. To say that it is ‘fundamental’ 
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in itself does not answer the question, because one then has to decide what one means by 
‘fundamental.’ I tried to interpret the idea ‘fundamental’ in basic science to mean having the 
greatest kind of bearing on the rest of science, and even on other human knowledge.”65  
Such a stance holds clear utility for the director of a large, broadly invested laboratory such as 
Oak Ridge. Weinberg valued research programs that would promote useful connections with 
other enterprises within the laboratory or shore up the laboratory’s social and political support. 
Weinberg’s relational approach, which focused on the interconnectedness of knowledge, 
set him in direct opposition to the emerging orthodoxy within particle physics. His disconnect 
with Weisskopf is evident in a co-authored Physics Today article entitled “Two Open Letters,” 
published June 1964. Weisskopf argued that “the nucleon is the basis for all matter and therefore 
of all science,” whereas Weinberg retorted that he was nonetheless, “justified in characterizing 
high-energy physics as ‘rather remote.’”66 Weisskopf emphasized the possibility in principle of 
reducing higher-level laws to lower, but Weinberg focused on the impracticality of doing physics 
from the bottom up. Weisskopf claimed that theories of lower levels were privileged because 
higher-level theories could be reduced to them; Weinberg allowed any field that met his 
fecundity criteria to claim privilege. It did not matter for Weinberg, when choosing which 
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research to fund, whether or not higher-level phenomena could, in principle, be explained in 
terms of lower-level phenomena after the fact because, contra Weisskopf, he tested the degree of 
fundamentality research exhibited by its relationship to other areas of knowledge rather than by 
its purported relationship to physical reality. These difference account for why Weisskopf and 
Weinberg talked past each other: they disagreed at the core about how fundamentality was 
derived 
Anderson’s entry into this discussion did not, as might seem natural, mirror Weinberg’s 
argument that fundamental research is that which exhibits broad relevance. Instead, he rejected 
Weisskopf’s narrow characterization of intensive research. Anderson’s “More Is Different” 
marks a transition in the form the debate took. He adopted a permissive view of fundamentality, 
like Bitter and Weinberg, but he abandoned the fecundity argument. Anderson accepted one of 
the particle physicists’ terms of debate. He agreed with his reductionist opponents that 
fundamentality was innate to some types of scientific knowledge. He disagreed with them about 
the realms in which it could be found. Despite differences with his allies, he did attempt to 
ground their primary conclusion—that reductionist physics should not be funded to the detriment 
of other fields—on a sound philosophical basis. In doing so he focused the debate around a 
single disagreement about the nature of scientific knowledge. 
“More Is Different” begins: “The reductionist hypothesis may still be a topic for 
controversy among philosophers, but among the great majority of active scientists I think it is 
accepted without question.”67 Some biologists, chemists, psychologists, or even other solid state 
physicists might have resisted this characterization, but the statement did reflect prevailing trends 
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in the physics community. In 1970, particle physics research received approximately four 
government dollars for every one spent on basic solid state research.68 This was despite the fact 
that the American Physical Society’s Division of Solid State Physics remained the largest 
division and was over twice as large as the Division of Particles and Fields.69 The reductionist 
hypothesis—even if it was not, as Anderson claimed, naïvely accepted within the scientific 
community broadly—was reflected in the way the federal government funded physics. 
Anderson opposed the reasoning, which he attributed to particle physicists, “that if 
everything obeys the same fundamental laws, then the only scientists who are studying anything 
really fundamental are those who are working on those laws.”70 This view, according to 
Anderson, started from the hypothesis that laws and concepts operating on any given level of 
complexity could be reduced to laws and concepts at a lower level of complexity. It thereby 
concluded that only research addressing the ultimate constituents of matter and energy could be 
truly fundamental. The reductionist argument built into particle physicists’ philosophy of 
scientific knowledge the justification for pursuing research on progressively smaller scales, using 
accelerators of progressively higher energy and greater cost. By arguing that the foundational 
character of smaller physical scales conferred privilege upon knowledge of the laws governing 
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those scales, reductionism supported the view that science funding should reflect the hierarchy 
particle physicists saw in the physical world. 
To undermine this position, Anderson moved past the Weinberg Criterion and its 
emphasis on conceptual, technological, and social applicability. He accepted the standard 
reductionist premise that laws governing higher-level phenomena could be reduced to laws 
governing lower-level phenomena, but rejected the inverse, claiming that the particle physicists’ 
view of fundamentality rested on a constructionist hypothesis, which assumed that higher-level 
laws could be extrapolated from lower-level laws. With this move, Anderson attacked the narrow 
definition of intensive research that underwrote the reductionist scientific hierarchy, preserving 
the ability of solid state physicists to claim fundamental insight, contending: “The main fallacy 
of this kind of thinking is that the reductionist hypothesis does not by any means imply a 
‘constructionist’ one: The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not 
imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe.”71 Anderson’s emergence-
based view of fundamentality granted the concepts and laws of solid state physics independence 
by virtue of the fact that they could not realistically be derived from lower-level concepts and 
laws alone. 
He illustrated his point with the example of an ammonia molecule, aiming to demonstrate 
construction’s failure even at the level of simple molecular systems. Naïvely, ammonia should 
have a dipole moment, given its pyramidal structure’s asymmetry. A nitrogen atom forms polar 
covalent bonds with three hydrogen atoms, leaving the nitrogen with a net negative and the 
hydrogen with a net positive charge. The resulting tetrahedron, though, does not empirically 
behave like a dipole. In its stationary state, the molecule is in a superposition of the left hand and 
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right hand orientations; when observed through time it undergoes a process of inversion, in 
which the nitrogen atom tunnels through the triangle of hydrogen atoms and emerges on the 
other side, several billion times per second. 
A broad swath of physicists would have been familiar with ammonia’s properties; it 
provided the material basis for the original maser, which Charles Townes and his research group 
had announced, to considerable acclaim, in 1955.72 Nitrogen inversion itself had been a familiar 
chemical process for several decades. It received renewed interest in the mid-1950s when nuclear 
magnetic resonance spectroscopy allowed it to be measured with accuracy superior to that 
provided by older radio-frequency techniques.73 Anderson leveraged a familiar example to 
illustrate the implausibility of applying foundational symmetry laws to larger systems without 
reference to higher-level structure: “I would challenge you to start from the fundamental laws of 
quantum mechanics and predict the ammonia inversion and its easily observable properties 
without going through the stage of using the unsymmetrical pyramidal structure, even though no 
‘state’ ever has that structure.”74 Construction, in other words, is impracticable: “The relationship 
between the system and its parts is intellectually a one-way street. Synthesis is expected to be all 
but impossible; analysis on the other hand, may not only be possible but fruitful in all kinds of 
ways,” a result he hoped would undercut “the arrogance of the particle physicist” and allow that 
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“each level can require a whole new conceptual structure.”75 Anderson did not draw out this 
statement’s implications, but it is tempting to see the tacit suggestion that a whole new 
conceptual structure would require a whole new funding structure. 
The distinction between impossible in practice and impossible in principle lingers under 
the surface of Anderson’s analysis. He rejected the restrictive view of intensive research, and yet 
hedged when saying that synthesis of lower-level laws to find higher-level laws is “all but 
impossible” and calling it an “intellectual,” rather than a physical or natural one-way street. He 
claimed that the laws of solid state physics could never practically be extrapolated from quantum 
mechanics without reference to empirically established, higher-level phenomena; he fought shy 
of the stronger claim that higher-level laws could never in principle be derived from below.  
Anderson does not explain the delicate dance he executes by linking the independence of 
higher-level concepts to practical rather than physical considerations. I propose four reasons this 
position is notable. The first two reflect Anderson’s more general focus on the practice of 
science. The third and fourth draw on other elements of his context and help explain how “More 
Is Different” fit within it. I do not reject the possibility that Anderson quite straightforwardly 
considered the argument that new levels were independent in practice to be the better-justified 
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position. Rather than providing an exhaustive account of why Anderson held the view he did, the 
factors discussed below demonstrate how richly interconnected Anderson’s position was with the 
professional context. Anderson has himself acknowledged that his perspectives were shaped by 
conditions in the scientific community that were unfavorable to solid state physicists: 
“Sociologists of science posit that there is a personal or emotional subtext behind much scientific 
work, and that its integrity is therefore necessarily compromised. I agree with the first but reject 
the second. I think ‘More Is Different’ embodies these truths. The article was unquestionably the 
result of a buildup of resentment and discontent on my part and among the condensed matter 
physicists I normally spoke with.”76 As a result, considering how the fine structure of Anderson’s 
argument worked within the context that motivated it can be instructive. 
The first reason Anderson’s focus on practical level independence is notable is that it 
reflects his more general focus on scientific practice. Here, he represents continuity with Bitter 
and Weinberg. Permissive views of fundamentality were uniformly hardheaded about the process 
of scientific research. The in-principle derivability of higher-level phenomena was useless if it 
provided no practical directives for doing science. Anderson reprised his argument in 2001: “a 
perverse reader could postulate a sufficiently brilliant genius—a super-Einstein—who might see 
at least the outlines of the phenomena at the new scale; but the fact is that neither Einstein nor 
Feynman succeeded in solving superconductivity.”77 Similarly, Anderson’s ammonia example 
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drew its force from the fact that anyone attempting to describe an ammonia molecule’s behavior 
for the first time would, by any reasonable understanding of practice, be required to employ 
higher-level concepts in addition to so-called first principles. 
Second, that necessity supplied a font of new solid state problems. In a 1999 interview 
with Alexei Kojevnikov, Anderson recalled being motivated to develop his philosophical views 
in part by a lecture Brian Pippard, a Cambridge solid state theorist, had given at a 
superconductivity conference hosted by IBM in 1960.78 Pippard lamented a lack of compelling 
and accessible fundamental problems in solid state, suggesting that solutions to the most 
prominent—such as superconductivity—had deprived the field of appealing intellectual 
challenges for young talent. Pippard offered up the gloomy prognostication that “ten years is 
going to see the end of our [solid state physicists’] games as pure physicists, though not as 
technologists,” and advocated “a swing of emphasis now away from pure research to 
applications,” which should necessitate exposing promising students to “the methods of research 
in industrial laboratories.”79 Anderson, who spent the 1967–1968 academic year as Pippard’s 
colleague during a visiting professorship at Cambridge, described him as “a professional 
pessimist.”80 The second axis of Anderson’s argument from practice is evident in his reaction 
                                                                                                                                                       
Wolfgang Pauli’s more cutting version of the theorem: theories of superconductivity are wrong. 
See: Jörg Schmalian, “Failed Theories of Superconductivity,” in BCS: 50 Years, ed. Leon N. 
Cooper and Dmitri Feldman (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011), 41–56. 
78 Philip W. Anderson, interview by Alexei Kojevnikov on 23 Nov 1999, NBL, 
http://www.aip.org/history/ohilist/23362_3.html (accessed 14 Nov 2011). 
79 Brian Pippard, “The Cat and the Cream,” PT 14, no. 11 (1961): 38–41, on 40–41. 
80 Anderson, interview (ref. 78). 
  44 
against Pippard’s pessimism regarding academic solid state research. “More Is Different” makes 
the case for the widespread availability of academy-friendly, intellectually interesting basic 
research problems in solid state physics. The practical necessity of employing higher-level 
concepts to describe solid state systems provided, for Anderson, a nearly inexhaustible supply of 
new and interesting fundamental questions. The failure of construction ensured that solving 
longstanding problems did not impoverish the field so much as Pippard supposed; surprising 
physics could always be expected when considering the next level of complexity. This 
interpretation meshes well with Anderson’s clear preference for practical considerations, because 
the question of in-principle independence had little bearing on whether an adequate supply of 
interesting research problems would be available to slake the intellectual thirst of future graduate 
students. 
Third, the narrow focus on practice was expedient. A strong claim about the nature of 
objective physical reality was not essential to allow solid state research a claim to fundamental 
knowledge given an argument that denied the practical possibility of synthesis. Because claims 
to fundamental knowledge and financial support were correlated during this period, at least for 
particle physicists, Anderson can be read as making the weakest claim necessary to advance his 
position without inviting attack from those who objected to the wholesale independence of 
higher levels from lower levels. So long as the case could be made for acquiring knowledge of 
higher levels, questions of physical hierarchy were merely academic.81  
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Finally, the contours of Anderson’s philosophical position and the consequences it had 
for fundamentality debates can be understood in terms of changing prestige politics in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Physics enjoyed considerable prestige following World War II, but as the 
funding plateau Weinberg predicted arrived, prestige, like financial support, became a limited 
resource, leaving physicists to carve it up among their sub-disciplines. Separating reduction and 
construction severed the link between physical hierarchy and intellectual prestige. Anderson 
sought to deny particle physicists an exclusive claim to fundamental knowledge, knowing, as 
Weinberg did, that “fundamental” often meant the same thing as “important.” The weaker 
position also avoided the question of whether a permissive view undermined the prestige of 
physics more generally. Solid state might have been struggling in this period, but physics was 
still firmly established as the standard bearer for American science. A stronger view implying the 
equivalence of all scientific knowledge would have been strange given the circumstances. Cat’s 
analysis is useful here when considering the relationship between physics and other sciences. By 
avoiding strong claims about the ultimate nature of reality, Anderson shifted the focus to 
methodology as a basis by which physics could be at once internally unified and delineated from 
other sciences.82 Although Anderson gives no indication that this was a conscious motivation, his 
argument does have the convenient consequence of undermining the exclusive claim particle 
                                                                                                                                                       
methodology, rather than by the reduction to a single set of laws and concepts, then fundamental 
physical knowledge need not be restricted to the lowest level of complexity. 
82 Ibid. 
  46 
physicists laid on fundamental knowledge without similarly undermining the more general 
entitlement physicists felt to rare levels of social approbation and federal funding.83 
Examination of these contextual pressures brings Anderson’s departure from Bitter and 
Weinberg into focus. The difference between his views and his predecessors’ corresponds to a 
shift in conditions within the scientific community. The funding pinch in the late 1960s and early 
1970s was asymmetrical. Particle physics, the flagship enterprise of reductionism, enjoyed 
continued success in the form of new, expensive facilities. Anderson recognized the growing 
prestige and funding gaps between solid state and particle physics. Amid these conditions, which 
became more acute as large government grants became more difficult to obtain, Anderson 
developed a view of fundamentality that departed sharply from fecundity arguments, although it 
arrived at similar conclusions. Given the undistinguished, impecunious position Anderson 
perceived solid state physics to occupy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the well-worn claim 
that research needed only to provide a basis for further research to be fundamental would not 
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have met the challenge particle physics posed. Instead, Anderson sought the source of 
fundamentality in the nature of physical knowledge, adopting the strategy that had served 
particle physicists so well. “More Is Different” makes the best historical sense when placed 
against the foil of particle physics and its strong reductionism and set within a context where 
physics still dominated American science. The fecundity notion of fundamentality implied no 
hierarchy and did not play favorites among the sciences. Anderson, by accepting the innate view 
of fundamentality more typical of the reductionist account, denied particle physics an exclusive 
claim to the privilege physical knowledge enjoyed, as a matter of course, over chemical, 
biological, or social scientific knowledge.  
Solid state physicists had been concerned with keeping disciplines like chemistry at a 
safe distance since the 1940s. Among those most concerned with maintaining that boundary was 
Anderson’s Ph.D. advisor, John Van Vleck. In 1944, Van Vleck, in the same exchange with 
Roman Smoluchowski during which he lamented the Balkanization of physics, wrote: “The idea 
that various groups whose main interest is not physics must be coddled, in order to make them 
members of the American Physical Society, has never appealed to me.”84 Smoluchowski did not 
object to the sentiment, but replied that forming an entity to advocate for the interests of metals 
physics did not constitute an effort to bring other fields under the umbrella of physics, but rather 
“an attempt to prevent ‘an invasion and partition by powerful neighbors’ (i.e. chemists and 
metallurgists).”85 Changes in the physics during in the 1960s and early 1970s gave solid state 
physicists the inverse worry: they felt isolated from the center of the physics community. 
Anderson responded by developing a philosophy aimed at halting that process by reaffirming 
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solid state’s contributions to the conceptual core of physics.  
 “More Is Different” pursued this goal by arguing the negative case that fundamentality 
was not unique to particle physics. Anderson gave examples of non-reductionist physics that he 
believed provided fundamental contributions, but his positive account of what it means to be 
fundamental was less developed. Max Dresden, in 1974, described more fully a positive program 
compatible with Anderson’s position.  Dresden, best known to historians of physics for his 
biography of Hendrik Kramers, was a polymath within the physics community.86 He was a 
Dutch-born émigré, who arrived in the United States in the late 1930s and earned his Ph.D. from 
the University of Michigan in 1946 with a dissertation in statistical physics. His career was 
peripatetic; he hopped from the University of Kansas to Northwestern University and then to the 
University of Iowa before settling at the State University of New York at Stony Brook in the 
mid-1960s. Both geographically and conceptually, Dresden developed a broad perspective. In 
addition to moving between many institutions, Dresden was able to turn his acumen with 
statistical methods to a plethora of problems in many subfields of physics. By the time he 
rendered his verdict on reductionism, he was familiar with the conceptual and professional issues 
both particle and solid state physicists faced.  
Unlike Anderson, Dresden confronted the in principle versus in practice question head 
on. He argued that physical descriptions at different scales were, in principle, autonomous from 
descriptions of their substrata on the basis of the distinctness of the concepts employed at higher 
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levels of description. Considering how the foundational concepts of solid state physics—such as 
lattice structures, energy bands, free electrons, phonons, and electron-phonon interactions—
relate to the supposedly “more fundamental” description of solid state systems in terms of 
component parts and their interactions, Dresden argued: 
The level in which the analysis is carried out, really defines the scale – and the autonomy 
of the scales and the lack of any simple relationship between the scales, follows directly 
from the manner in which they were obtained. This means that every level of description 
has to develop its own concepts and methods, for organizing and structuring its 
information. In this process reference to underlying, deeper levels, to universal results of 
those levels might be useful and important. But … the search for regularities and 
concepts, especially adapted to the level under study can not exclusively (or primarily) be 
based on a deductive analysis of the deeper levels. Thus the independence of the scales is 
every bit as important as their interrelations.87 
Dresden’s discussion complements Anderson’s by emphasizing the impossibility of deducing the 
higher-level concepts that constitute the medium of scientific exchange in solid state physics 
from first principles.  
Like others who sought, in his words, a “less partisan” account of fundamentality, 
Dresden focused on the creation of scientific knowledge rather than post hoc rationalizations of 
its place within a unifying scheme.88 He took a stronger stand than Anderson did on the in-
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principle independence of higher-level phenomena. Dresden did not defend the claim that 
physics would remain more fundamental than other disciplines given the autonomy of higher-
level concepts, but he limited his discussion to physical considerations, discussing chemistry 
only to show that molecules provided examples of physical complexity.89 Discussions such as 
Anderson’s and Dresden’s reflected the tensions between different branches of physics, and, 
while many of the views they advanced had consequences beyond that realm, those 
consequences were pushed to the background, as even physicists with permissive views of 
fundamentality accepted the field’s privileged place in American science. 
 Anderson’s and others’ refinements of earlier conceptions of fundamentality suggest 
how changing financial realities and corresponding hierarchical shifts within the scientific 
community exerted pressure on scientists to develop philosophical stances. Solid state physicists’ 
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fecundity-based view of fundamentality was well adapted to the early post-World War II funding 
environment. Changes in the environment and growth of a competing philosophy in the form of 
virulent reductionism among particle physicists motivated an extension and sharpening of their 
position, leading physicists to place their convictions on more philosophically rigorous ground. 
To whatever extent Anderson’s views on fundamentality might have been based in his research, 
he was moved to refine and articulate them by professional challenges. 
 
[FIRST LEVEL HEADING] CASE STUDY 3: THE SUPERCONDUCTING SUPER 
COLLIDER 
The previous two case studies have explored how individuals’ convictions about 
fundamentality manifested in the establishment and administration of a laboratory and how a 
changing professional environment motivated some physicists to advance pointed philosophical 
arguments. These examples, alone or in tandem, are insufficient to show how philosophical 
considerations played out on the level national priorities and large-scale funding decisions. The 
third case study, which focuses on the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC), indicates how 
philosophical commitments shaped interactions between the scientific community and the 
political entities that supported it, and how physicists reimagined those commitments as a result. 
The current literature provides a detailed accounting of the factors that led to the SSC’s demise.90 
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This case study does not aim to replicate such efforts, but instead to examine the SSC as an 
example of how physicists’ philosophical debates intensified, changed, and probed the limits of 
their influence when they entered a more public context. 
By the mid 1980s, when the SSC project was gathering inertia, both the restrictive and 
permissive concepts of fundamentality were established doctrine for the particle and solid state 
communities, respectively. The SSC, in its very concept, was the apotheosis of the reductionist 
commitment to exploring the energy frontier in search of ultimate physical truth. As reductionist 
sentiment peaked among particle physicists, a sizable segment of the solid state community had 
begun to rebrand themselves “condensed matter physicists,” emphasizing “the discoveries of 
fundamental new phenomena and states of matter, the development of new concepts, and the 
opening up of new subfields,” the investigation of complex matter generated.91  
Each of these perspectives would be challenged, and deformed, during the grueling cross-
examinations the SSC and its mushrooming price tag endured in both congressional committees 
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and the court of public opinion. Particle physicists articulated the strongest forms of 
reductionism they could muster in order to justify expenditures on physics, which, on the face, 
was remote from quotidian social, economic, and national security concerns. Simultaneously 
they embellished the standard reductionist justification with spin-off claims in an attempt to meet 
the unambiguous congressional demand for return on investment. Solid state physicists also 
tailored their views as they tried to balance Anderson’s claim for the innate intellectual value of 
complex concepts with Alvin Weinberg’s argument for funding physics on the basis of 
demonstrated conceptual, social, and technological relevance. 
Although solid state physicists and particle physicists had their squabbles in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the hegemony of physics within the American scientific community remained intact 
through these decades. By 1993, when Congress cut off funding to the SSC, biology was 
ascendant.92 The Human Genome Project, launched in 1990, represented the new face of big 
science; physics no longer held the unchallenged excess of scientific prestige and political 
influence it had enjoyed earlier in the century. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and 
economic hiccups of the early 1990s—which Kevles has detailed—eroded the national patience 
for large expenditures, whose payoffs lay beyond the horizon.93 Shifts in the prevailing national 
goals in the early 1990s led both to the extravagant spin-off claims high-energy physicists made 
while trying to justify the SSC, and to a resurgence of the fundamentality-as-fecundity view 
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among solid state physicists, who felt renewed pressure to promote the relevance of solid state 
work to other areas of science, technology, and society. 
The philosophical disputes of the 1960s and 1970s had remained internal to the scientific 
community. The corresponding conflicts in the late 1980s and early 1990s expanded from the 
confines of Science and Physics Today to the floor of Congress and the pages of the popular 
press. When the formerly arcane dispute became a matter of public policy and the implications 
for the future of physics in the United States became clearer, physicists voiced their views more 
forcefully and to more varied audiences. At the same time, the currency those views carried 
diminished among scientists who were forced to contend with myriad other concerns that 
populated the legislative milieu. The combination of shifted social priorities and the transition to 
a larger stage led both solid state and particle physicists to reformulate their views. 
Spin-off claims from particle physicists represented one clear rhetorical shift. Many SSC 
advocates, including SSC Director Roy Schwitters, perceived that high-minded declarations 
about the ennobling nature of fundamental knowledge would not be sufficient to convince 
legislators that the project was worthwhile. “Elementary particle physics does not exist in 
isolation,” Schwitters asserted in his written statement for a 1989 meeting of a Senate’s 
Subcommittee meeting on the Department of Energy budget: “Stimulation, information, and 
techniques flow both ways: from other activities toward particle physics, and from particle 
physics toward other activities.”94 He emphasized intellectual overlap with nuclear physics, 
cosmology, and solid state, and stressed that the demands of accelerator engineering had 
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technological knock-on effects for computing, superconducting magnets, and semiconductor 
devices. The cutting edge technical needs of accelerators, Schwitters maintained, “provide 
fruitful interchange with other researchers, manufacturers, and developers of technology in fields 
such as medical imagery.”95 Such claims aimed to establish that particle physics could be 
fundamental in a relational sense and an innate sense. 
Fecundity arguments and reductionist arguments were sometimes conflated even more 
directly. Cosmologist George Smoot, testifying in 1992 before a hearing on the “Importance and 
Status of the Superconducting Super Collider,” recounted an anecdote about sharing a plane with 
a group of cataract patients traveling for laser surgery only available in the United States, which 
he used to illustrate the claim: “It just shows you do not know what development is going to turn 
out to be something useful…. You really have to understand the basics of all science. That is 
where physics, and particularly higher energy physics comes together because physics is what 
we call the queen of sciences. It is the basic underlying structure for all of sciences, the 
foundation everything sits on. You have to understand physics to understand what is going on.”96 
The rhetorical strategy that tied the supposed generative power of particle physics to its status as 
the science of the fundamental scale proved controversial, even among SSC advocates. 
Smoot, for example, testified immediately after Leon Lederman, who had won a Nobel 
Prize in 1988 for his neutrino research. Lederman gave legislators a more conventional version 
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of reductionist rhetoric. He employed the strategy, popular among particle physicists during the 
hearings, of casting the SSC as the culmination of a narrative beginning in Ancient Greece: “The 
road from Miletis [sic] to the SSC is what philosophers call a reductionist road. … Until we can 
complete the unification process and make the picture mathematically whole, the question of 
how the world works will not be answered.”97 He dissociated the reductionist justification from 
spin-offs claims: “[Technological benefits] would be a crazy reason to build the SSC. We do not 
build it for the spin-offs. We build it because we are humans who think and are insatiably 
curious, and have an unquenchable determination to know,” recalling Robert Wilson’s apology 
for the National Accelerator Laboratory 25 years earlier.98 
Lederman’s argument contrasts the willingness of his younger colleagues to adopt 
fecundity arguments when convenient. The split might well have been generational. Schwitters 
and Smoot were both born in the mid-1940s and earned their doctorates in the early 1970s. In 
contrast Lederman, born in 1922, along with another advocate for the unembellished reductionist 
justification, Steven Weinberg, born in 1933, were among the generation who had overseen the 
articulation of the philosophy in the 1960s. For them, stooping to arguments on the basis of 
technological output weakened the justification for pursuing fundamental physics for its own 
sake. The high stakes of the SSC debates influenced these two groups differently. On one hand, 
it promoted an intensification of the reductionism that had underwritten particle physics’ push to 
higher energies through the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, suspicions that such a 
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justification would not work on its own prompted younger physicists to advance the fecundity 
argument in the form of spin-off claims, which Lederman found unnecessary.  
Although divided about how spin-off claims meshed with fundamentality claims, particle 
physicists—and cosmologists, who were close allies of the SSC throughout the hearings—were 
uniformly of the opinion that the SSC was valuable because it could offer fundamental 
knowledge where other facilities, and other branches of physics, could not. They maintained the 
belief, summarized by S. S. Schweber, that “elementary particle physics has a privileged 
position, in that the ontology of its domain and the order manifested by that domain refer to the 
building blocks of the higher levels.”99 Steven Weinberg provided the most impassioned defense 
of the strong reductionist position. The 1979 Nobel Prize had recognized his work unifying 
electromagnetism and the weak nuclear force, and he was a visible public advocate for 
reductionist science, writing a popular book that expressed optimism for the culmination of 
physics with a unified physical theory.100 Throughout the hearings he presented justifications for 
building the SSC alongside a broader view of science. “We are at the frontier,” he testified in 
August 1993 in a hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the 
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development of the Committee on Appropriations; “we 
have pushed the chain of questions why as far as we can, and as far as we can tell we cannot 
make any progress without the super collider.” He continued: “Well, who cares? You know, 
there are a lot of people, a lot of Americans, a lot of members of Congress who really see science 
only in terms of its applications. And that is a respectable view. Not everyone is turned on by the 
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same things. Not everyone likes classical music. Not everyone has this hunger to know why the 
world is the way it is, and we have to live with that. I find it sad, myself, but that is the way 
people are.”101 By identifying those who cared only about applications as the SSC’s main 
opponents, Weinberg ignored the objection Anderson and others mounted that particle physics 
was not the only route to fundamental insight. Weinberg’s testimony throughout the SSC 
hearings grew from the assumption that “without this machine we simply cannot continue the 
process of uncovering nature’s fundamental laws.”102 His claim was not only that the United 
States should fund the SSC because it provided fundamental knowledge, but because it was the 
only route to fundamental knowledge; everything else was derivative. By the early 1990s, the 
state of the art in reductionism was substantially more virulent than it had been in the 1960s and 
1970s.103 Victor Weisskopf considered particle physics the science most fully directed towards 
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fundamental principles, but he saw it as occupying one extreme of smooth scale rather than as a 
categorically unique enterprise. 
[Fig. 4 about here] 
The psychological effectiveness of Steven Weinberg’s dichotomy between 
fundamental/pro-SSC views and applied/anti-SSC views became evident when the committee 
chairman, Senator J. Bennett Johnston, Jr. (D-LA), introduced the next witness: “a distinguished 
Nobel laureate. Professor Philip P. Anderson from the Department of Physics, I think that is 
Applied Physics, at Princeton University.”104 Departing from his prepared testimony, Anderson 
offered two corrections for the record: “Senator Johnston and this committee, and the 
Democratic National Committee are the only two people who give me the middle initial ‘P’ 
when my actual middle initial is ‘W’. And I receive a lot of mail from the Democratic National 
Committee to Phil P. Anderson. And I am not an applied physicist. I like to call myself a 
fundamental physicist as well. I just am fundamental in somewhat different ways.”105 Anderson 
endeavored to undermine Weinberg’s hard and fast distinction between fundamental physics and 
applied physics, just as he had sought to undermine Weisskopf’s distinction between intensive 
and extensive research two decades earlier. Johnston’s initial error provided him an opportune 
segue into that argument. 
Anderson’s opposition to the SSC was two pronged: First, he advocated a permissive 
form of fundamentality that opposed particle physicists’ attempts to justify the SSC on a 
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reductionist basis; second, he argued for the need to establish scientific priorities, much as Alvin 
Weinberg had in 1964. By introducing the second line of argument, Anderson departed from 
“More Is Different,” where the question of funding remained in the background. His SSC 
testimony repurposed his arguments about the character of scientific knowledge to underwrite a 
picture of how science funding should be organized. Like Steven Weinberg, his testimony 
transcended the SSC and pushed a perception of science that had broader implications. Anderson 
did not oppose the SSC per se, but objected to the consolidation of financial support for non-
applied research in big-budget particle physics installations while solid state, confined to smaller 
labs, pursued narrow, practical objectives and found scant opportunity for intellectual curiosity. 
The narrow focus was a consequence, he believed, of the conflation of fundamentality with 
reduction. He described fundamental research in solid state as, “caught between the Scylla of the 
glamorous big science projects like the SSC, the genome, and the space station, and the 
Charybdis of the programmed research, where you have deliverables, where you are asked to do 
very specific pieces of research aimed at some very short-term goal.”106 
Anderson attempted a precarious traverse of this rhetorical Strait of Messina. He 
advocated funding fundamental research for its own sake and opposed funding for preconceived, 
near-term technological outcomes. He opposed the SSC because, a) solid state was just as 
fundamental as particle physics, and b) funding exploratory solid state research with no strings 
attached would, as a matter of course, produce more socially and technologically valuable 
results. Solid state could boast sterling technological bona fides, but advocating funding priority 
over the SSC strictly on that basis would undercut Anderson’s mission to demonstrate solid 
state’s intellectual merit. Even if a technological justification would have fallen more musically 
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on many legislators’ ears, solid state’s fight for intellectual prestige was too strong a component 
of its identity for Anderson to sell it short. 
Anderson parsed his objections to the SSC in terms of how particle physics fit into his 
broader view of science. Before the House of Representatives Task Force on Defense, Foreign 
Policy and Space in 1991 he delivered the same message he would give the Senate: 
The standard testimony you will receive on behalf of the SSC will tell you that in some 
sense elementary particle physics, high-energy physics is the bellwether of the sciences, 
the one which is out there leading the pack, the one which in some sense is investigating 
the ‘deepest’ layers of reality in the world around us and the ‘most fundamental’ laws of 
physics. … [T]here is at least one other kind of frontier in the physical sciences where a 
lot of action—and I would argue more action—is taking place: the frontier of looking at 
bigger and more complex aggregates of matter which often behave in new ways and 
according to new laws. These new laws don’t contradict the laws the elementary particle 
people discover; they are simply independent of them, and I would argue they are in no 
way any less or any [more] fundamental.107 
Given the expense of particle physics, Anderson’s testimony continued, what does it contribute 
in proportion to the funds it receives? How many scientists does it employ? Does the knowledge 
it produces either motivate practical applications or stimulate research in other areas of science? 
The answers to these questions should, in his view, determine how science is funded.  
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Like particle physicists, who were compelled to make dubious spin-off claims to justify 
the SSC, solid state physicists were also wrenched into some uncomfortable contortions by the 
demands of a Congress eager to cut spending. For Anderson, this meant dulling his subtle 
argument of “More Is Different” and embroidering his stance with elements of the Weinberg 
Criterion. The position Anderson articulated in 1972 still grounded his opposition to the SSC, but 
his arguments in the 1990s were blunter. He claimed that laws governing complex systems were 
independent rather than not derivable. He leaned heavily on social and technological relevance in 
a way he had not in 1972. Anderson’s views evolved in response to developments in the 
organization of science. The pressures of reforming his philosophy for a public audience forced 
him to argue simultaneously for the intellectual autonomy of solid state physics and for its social 
and technological merits, a combination he delicately packaged as a single, coherent view. 
Weinberg and Anderson each had an agenda that transcended the SSC and they spoke for 
their respective communities. Each used his agenda to frame his testimony. Congress therefore 
heard competing views of scientific research and its goals as much as they heard arguments for 
or against the SSC.108 That more was at stake than a single research facility is evident from the 
extent to which the SSC debate spilled over into the popular press. Both Weinberg and Lederman 
published popular books espousing a reductionist view of science.109 Weinberg took his case to 
the pages of the New York Times in March 1993, as the SSC’s prospects grew dire. In an op-ed 
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entitled “The Answer to (Almost) Everything” Weinberg appealed to a popular audience with an 
example about the weather, writing: “Elementary particle physics is more fundamental than, say, 
meteorology, not because it will help us predict the weather, but because there are no 
independent principles of meteorology that do not rest on the properties of elementary 
particles.”110 
Weinberg’s article angered solid state physicists, and some shot back. Northwestern 
physicist Pulak Dutta retorted in a letter to the editor: “The public relations triumph of particle 
physics is that it has cast itself as the sole heir of atomic physics and quantum mechanics, and 
thus irrefutably ‘fundamental.’ However … we’ve known for some time that elementary 
particles are made of quarks, but that hasn’t made (and isn’t likely to make) any difference to any 
other area of human activity. It just isn’t fundamental to anything.”111 Dutta’s rehearsal of Alvin 
Weinberg’s criterion for scientific choice in the face of Steven Weinberg’s on-the-nose brand of 
reductionism reflected the mood among solid state researchers. They viewed particle physicists 
as demanding extraordinary resources while maligning the intellectual merit of solid state 
physics and making unrealistic spin-off claims for a field with little measurable importance to 
other areas of science and few prospects for making socially or technologically useful 
contributions. 
[Fig. 5 about here] 
Though reductionist rhetoric had helped secure Fermilab’s funding in the 1960s, 
permissive, relational fundamentality held more sway with the 1990s Congress—even if it was 
secondary to the broader shift in which biology replaced physics as the marquee American 
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science. Congressman Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY), Chairman of the House Committee on 
Science, Space, and Technology, opened a May 1993 hearing by rehearsing arguments solid state 
physicists had presented: “My first concern is the basic question of priorities. SSC supporters 
like to suggest that to oppose the SSC is to oppose science. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. Science is not some indivisible domain but is made up of separate, if related, 
disciplines.”112 Similarly, in the Senate, Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR) brusquely dismissed the 
argument that particle physics and basic science were one and the same: “The assumption that 
anybody who opposes this project is opposed to basic science is a distraction and a diversion.”113 
By 1993, the arguments solid state physicists had presented to Congress over the preceding years 
were being echoed in the House and the Senate by Republicans and Democrats alike. The 
competing view solid state physicists offered allowed legislators to oppose a major scientific 
budget item without appearing to be anti-science. 
In Physics Today, the widely distributed news magazine published by the American 
Institute of Physics, discussions of the unity of physics paralleled the debate that played out in 
Congressional testimony and popular writings.114 In a letter published in March 1991, Lawrence 
Cranberg, a retired University of Virginia physicist who studied the physics of wood as it applied 
to domestic energy needs, wrote that particle physicists showed little interest in work not directly 
related to their own. He charged that, “the quest for unity has become a specialty that narrows so 
intensely the intellectual focus of its devotees that they are unwilling to be interested in anything 
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else in physics,” and asked, rhetorically: “Is that what we want to encourage when we speak of 
‘the unity of physics’? Or does such ‘unity’ condemn one to a snobbish isolation from the 
mainstream of scientific and human concerns?”115 Cranberg advocated accepting diversity as an 
equally potent ideal.116 His criticisms of the particle physics agenda show that the same tensions 
that arose over high-stakes projects like the SSC were much deeper, shaping discussions of the 
discipline’s direction throughout the physics community.117 
The same issue of Physics Today featured two articles from solid state physicists arguing 
for the importance of higher-level phenomena, shoring up the foundations of public arguments 
against the SSC, and favoring increased support for smaller projects. In the first, University of 
Chicago theorist Leo Kadanoff wrote on self-organization in physical systems, describing how 
plumes develop in heated fluids and finding “many different laws and many different levels of 
description.”118 Kadanoff’s focus on complex phenomena complemented the perspective he had 
presented as a regular contributor to Physics Today’s editorial page since the mid-1980s. In 1986 
he praised the ability to discern between practical and impractical demands for understanding 
and controlling complex systems as a key component of scientific judgment.119 In 1988 he 
brought his notion of good scientific judgment to bear on contemporary trends in government 
science funding: “The true value of science is in the development of beautiful and powerful 
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ideas. Overinvestment in big science detracts from what is really worthwhile. I do not think that 
the nation’s or the government’s budget for research or for R&D is too small. It is, however, 
increasingly misdirected toward grandiose projects. We physicists have a responsibility to 
understand what is truly valuable in science and use this understanding to help the nation 
develop and express its priorities.”120 Close links between intellectual merit and broader 
relevance, of the type Anderson expressed before Congress and Kadanoff articulated in Physics 
Today, became critical the solid state community’s outlook on the organization of science in 
America in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The second relevant article in March 1991’s Physics Today came from the American 
Physical Society president, Cornell’s James Krumhansl. The piece was based on his outgoing 
presidential address at the 1990 APS meeting in Washington. The speech itself came only two 
months before Krumhansl wrote to journalist Malcolm Browne, who himself had published an 
editorial in the New York Times raising doubts, “as to whether the new knowledge it [the SSC] 
generates will be commensurate with the enormous cost.”121 Krumhansl’s letter, which was 
entered into evidence during a 1992 Senate hearing, charged that: “extravagant representation to 
the public of the potential fruits from the SSC was fictitious and ethically irresponsible and that 
accurate acknowledgement was not given to researchers in many other subfields of physics 
which were the true source of contributions from physics to medicine, technology, economics 
and education but imputed to particle physics.”122 
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Krumhansl’s retirement address, and the article that grew from it, were more diplomatic 
than his private correspondence with Browne, but the message was the same: unity does not 
mean reduction, but rather the relevance of knowledge at all levels to the whole of physics.123 His 
message complemented those of Cranberg and Kadanoff. Anderson himself joint the exchange a 
few months later, writing: “With the maturation of physics, a new and different set of paradigms 
began to develop that pointed the other way [from reductionism], toward developing complexity 
out of simplicity.”124 Diversity and complexity, for solid state researchers working in the shadow 
of particle physics, were critical prerequisites for unity. They indicated that physical knowledge 
was interdependent rather than hierarchical, which in turn implied a methodological rather than a 
theoretical unity, and cemented their claim to fundamental knowledge. As Cat has argued, the 
reductionist unity particle physicists sought was counterproductive for the goal of 
methodological unity.125 This shared belief gave solid state researchers a singleness of purpose 
throughout the SSC debates. 
                                                
123 An example of difference in tone: whereas Krumhansl’s letter to Brown called SSC spin-off 
claims “fictitious and ethically irresponsible,” the same complaint in Physics Today reads: “our 
need to obtain patronage seems to force us into extravagant claims and the hard sell. In my view, 
what is most dangerous in such statements is the certainty that we imply for the ‘benefit’ of a 
public unable to judge the validity of claims.” James A. Krumhansl, “Unity in the Science of 
Physics,” PT 44, no. 3 (1991): 33–38, on 38. 
124 Philip W. Anderson, “Is Complexity Physics? Is it Science? What Is it?,” PT 44, no. 7 (1991): 
9–11, on 9. 
125 Cat, “Physicists’ Debates on Unification” (ref. 7). 
  68 
By the 1990s solid state physicists were expressing a consistent view of fundamentality, 
at least for a national audience. It was similar to what Francis Bitter and Alvin Weinberg 
described decades earlier. Solid state physicists championed a permissive approach that 
promoted research across disciplinary boundaries and encouraged diverse applications. Without 
the reductionist hegemony and its influence on government science funding, though, the position 
championed by the solid state community would never have developed to the extent it did. 
Virulent reductionism, and the success of its proponents, forced solid state physicists to develop 
their views on why knowledge of complex systems was not less fundamental than knowledge of 
simple systems, and on how money and prestige should be distributed accordingly. Anderson’s 
“More Is Different” responded to brewing discontent in the solid state community while physics 
was at the height of its prestige. Likewise, the resurgence of the Weinberg Criterion among solid 
state physicists, Anderson included, during the SSC debates was driven by angst over conditions 
that might allow the SSC to dominate the funding landscape as physics’s prestige was waning.  
In this particular skirmish, the permissive view of fundamentality prevailed. That is not to 
say that philosophy sank the SSC.126 Rather, a complex set of shifting social and political factors 
brought the views of influential solid state physicists more in line with the goals of Congress. An 
evolutionary metaphor is appropriate: changing ecological conditions conferred a selective 
advantage to a particular conception of science. The change in conditions is evident from the 
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success anti-reductionist rhetoric enjoyed before Congress. It is also clear from SSC advocates’ 
efforts to show that particle physics was not isolated from the rest of the sciences, to claim that 
reductionist knowledge was prerequisite for true understanding of higher levels, and to promise 
that the SSC would produce a vast array of technological spin-offs. SSC advocates recognized 
that the Weinberg Criterion resonated with Congress. Their attempts to exploit it were not so 
well coordinated as those of solid state physicists; however, those attempts do provide further 
indication of how the political environment changed after the Cold War. Physics was no longer 
the darling of government patrons, but philosophical diversity within the physics population 
allowed the physics community to adapt to a changing ecological landscape and frame itself 
compatibly with the new context, even if such compatibility came at the expense of its pride of 
place within American science. 
 
[FIRST LEVEL HEADING] CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding case studies have shown how philosophical outlooks, as elements of 
scientific discourse, shaped the American physics community’s internal politics and external 
interactions. These outlooks were, in turn, reshaped by this interaction. The conceptual details of 
scientific research alone did not bring about strongly articulated philosophical positions within 
the physics community. Instead, the institutional, financial, and political context in which that 
research took place catalyzed such views to grow from looser pre-existing convictions, which 
could also claim institutional roots. The historical study of these views, their origins, and their 
development can illuminate science’s structural evolution through the second half of the 
twentieth century. This section synthesizes the conclusions drawn from the examples above and 
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offers a brief sketch of how the way I have used scientists’ philosophical commitments here can 
be more generally applicable in the history of science.  
Scientists’ convictions about fundamentality operated at every level of scientific 
organization. Individuals with clear commitments sought to implement those commitments when 
they functioned as institution builders, as seen through the example of Francis Bitter and the 
National Magnet Laboratory. Changes such as growing funding asymmetries and the 
establishment of prestige hierarchies led individual scientists to craft and defend philosophical 
positions, as Anderson did with “More Is Different.” The case of the SSC reveals how the 
compatibility or incompatibility of scientists’ philosophies with national goals influenced the 
way the government supported scientific research. The story of how philosophical commitments 
were developed and deployed by solid state physicists mirrors the development of the field itself: 
from one of many new postwar subfields, to embattled physical sub-discipline, to mature 
specialty flexing a small measure of policy influence. 
The National Magnet Laboratory exemplifies how individual scientists’ commitments 
can guide the structure and mission of individual research installations. This was particularly true 
in the early post-World War II era when an abundance of government funding, with relatively 
few strings attached, meant that scientists enjoyed a large measure of autonomy when designing 
laboratories and assembling research groups. Internecine tensions ran low. The National Magnet 
Laboratory reflected Francis Bitter’s desire to pursue fundamental questions and train students to 
ask them. His conception of fundamentality, which emphasized the formulation of widely 
applicable theoretical principles and power of research to motivate further research, produced a 
lab that promoted cross-disciplinary dialogue and a close interaction between theory and its 
applications. The NML embodied the view of fundamental research that helped organize 
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American solid state physics. An emphasis on what I have called fecundity and a willingness to 
draw insights from chemistry, metallurgy, engineering, as well as from other areas of physics, 
facilitated solid state physicists’ efforts to unite a wide range of research programs within the 
institutional confines of a new sub-discipline. Bitter’s brainchild was representative of a field 
that sought fundamental insight at all levels and applied it as broadly as possible. 
Although a permissive approach functioned well within the laboratory, changes in the 
way the government funded science limited the power of NML administrators, and of solid state 
physicists generally, to fully determine the direction and scope of their research. Justifications 
that worked well for structuring a field’s internal interactions were contingent upon their 
compatibility with larger social priorities. This dependence grew as physical research demanded 
greater levels of financial support. Budgets tightened and competition between solid state 
physics and a dominant particle physics community escalated through the 1960s and 1970s. The 
philosophical preference for viewing fundamentality as attainable by physical research at all 
levels, with which solid state physicists defined their early research programs, evolved into a 
justificatory mechanism aimed at external funders and competitors within the scientific 
community. Philip Anderson’s “More Is Different” developed solid state physicists’ folk 
understanding of how fundamental research should be carried out into a description of 
fundamental scientific knowledge. Whereas the conceptions of fundamentality offered by 
Francis Bitter and Alvin Weinberg were fully relational, and therefore non-hierarchical, 
Anderson’s view conceived of fundamentality within a traditional hierarchical scheme that posed 
no challenge to the pride of place physics enjoyed in Cold War America. Anderson, and later 
Dresden, departed from previous views that saw fundamentality as a measure of utility for 
further work. In doing so, they staked out a more general position on what it meant to have 
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innately fundamental physical knowledge—knowledge composed of concepts that could not be 
attained by deriving them from something more basic. 
Anderson was motivated to articulate his views by the fight for resources, but financial 
struggles were not his only reasons. Particle physicists, by conflating fundamentality with 
reduction, threatened to monopolize the considerable prestige physicists enjoyed in the Cold War 
era United States. Particle and solid state physicists developed philosophical viewpoints that 
reflected the exigencies of doing expensive research in a competitive funding environment with a 
substantial degree of social approbation at stake. For particle physicists, a restrictive account of 
fundamentality justified federal funding for expensive installations with little hope for generating 
practical social or technological results. For solid state researchers, a permissive account, 
sharpened in reaction to reductionism, underwrote their claims to an equal slice of the basic 
research funding pie and equal or greater relevance to national priorities, both social and 
technological. Solid state physicists’ rapid response to the rise of reductionism complicates the 
picture that places particle physics at the nexus of philosophical and conceptual unity in the 
1960s and 1970s.127 
The sharpened perspectives that both solid state and particle physicists developed through 
the 1960s and 1970s provided the framework in which the SSC debates unfolded. Each view was 
deeply entrenched, to the point where the debate did not occur between physicists, but developed 
as each side reformulated old arguments for new audiences: Congress and the American public. 
The prevalence of these views, both in their expression on the floor of Congress, and their further 
dissemination through the popular press, meant that Congress members voting on the SSC were 
not faced with a choice between funding science and not funding science, but rather with a 
                                                
127 As in Stevens, “Fundamental Physics” (ref. 8). 
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choice between competing perspectives on what science should be seeking. Both Philip 
Anderson and Steven Weinberg, representing solid state and particle physicists respectively, 
presented a broad picture of how science should be done, shifting the debate away from the 
details of the SSC and onto the larger question of how science could best serve society. 
Anderson and his colleagues capitalized on their opportunity to influence national science policy 
by offering a contrast to reductionism and providing congressional opponents of the SSC a 
positive view of science to support and a mechanism by which to deflect the anti-science stigma 
that might have come from an anti-SSC vote. 
The SSC’s story indicates the complexity of how philosophical outlooks operated at the 
highest levels of the national scientific infrastructure. Advocates of both restrictive and 
permissive approaches to fundamentality advanced competing ideals of scientific success from 
the mid-1960s through the 1990s. Their relative success on a national level was predicated upon 
shifting external conditions. The end of the Cold War, growing economic concerns in the early 
1990s, and a freshman class of Representatives bent on sweeping spending cuts constituted a 
dramatic change in how members of Congress integrated science into their conception of the 
national interest.128 Congress moved from a willingness to fund large, expensive projects for the 
sake of national prestige and the slim chance of a major technological breakthrough to a more 
circumspect approach to the national science budget, in which specific deliverables should exist 
to guarantee a material return on investment. This change threatened the privilege of reductionist 
physics, which had historically operated on a mandate built from intellectual merit and only the 
remote possibility of technological payoff. Hoddeson and Kolb, quoting particle experimentalist 
David Ritson, point out that as the Atomic Energy Commission began morphing into the 
                                                
128 Kevles, “Death of the SSC” (ref. 90). 
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Department of Energy in 1975, physicists “became ‘just another group of constituents.’”129 The 
clout physicists, and particle physicists in particular, once wielded through the federal advisory 
apparatus had evaporated by the early 1990s. A philosophical basis for scientific research that 
allowed fundamental knowledge to coexist with a more concrete promise of technological 
applicability and cross-specialty relevance better complemented the prevailing political ecology. 
The role philosophical principles played in shaping the institutional missions, hierarchies 
of scientific communities, and the relationships between science and the broader society, 
changed at each level of interaction. Its importance on each of these levels indicates the extent to 
which philosophical considerations play a role in how scientists conceived of and ordered their 
professional activities. Scientists’ philosophical commitments are relevant not only to questions 
about how they conduct and interpret their research, but also to questions of how science is 
organized. Philosophical considerations are largely absent from institutional histories of later 
twentieth-century science. The cases considered here show, however, that they had a 
recognizable impact on the organization of American physics.130 
                                                
129 Hoddeson and Kolb, “Frontier Outpost” (ref. 90), on 308. 
130 This discussion focuses on physicists, but they were not the only scientists with robust 
philosophical agendas in the later twentieth century. Much has been written on reduction in 
twentieth-century biology, for example, and although I have not attempted to draw connections 
with that story here, the national ascendance of biology is necessary to understand the 
reorientation of physicists’ expectations at the end of the century. For a recent survey of 
philosophical debates over reduction in biology, see C. Kenneth Waters, “Beyond Theoretical 
Reduction and Layer-Cake Antireduction: How DNA Retooled Genetics and Transformed 
Biological Practice,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology, ed. Michael Ruse 
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Further investigation can reveal how philosophical views function similarly or differently 
at, and also between, various levels of scientific organization. I take the position, supported by 
the case studies above, that these questions must be answered within their specific domains. An 
analogy to Anderson’s argument in “More Is Different” is fitting: it is an empirical question how 
philosophical positions affect change at different structural levels; we cannot divine the results 
until we examine the relevant behavior at the appropriate scales. The articulation of 
philosophical views by influential scientists does not guarantee their manifestation within the 
national structure of science. The process through which those views exert their influence, and 
change in response to shifting external conditions, is much richer. The historical impact and 
development of these views in professional and institutional context therefore represents a 
fruitful area of research for historians of science. 
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